Register OpenID Connect clients with the Orchestrator’s built-in OIDC Provider. The Orchestrator acts as an authorization server, handling authentication flows, enriching claims from multiple identity sources, and providing seamless IdP failover — all without changes to your OIDC-compatible applications.Documentation Index
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Console vs. YAML: In the Maverics Console, an OIDC app’s authentication, authorization, claims, scopes, token settings, and the Identity Fabric components it relies on are configured directly on the application’s settings page. In YAML, these elements are configured within each app’s configuration block (for example under
apps[].authentication, apps[].authorization, and apps[].claimsMapping).Overview
An OIDC app registers an OpenID Connect client with the Orchestrator’s OIDC Provider mode. Each app entry defines a client with its own credentials, redirect URLs, grant types, and token settings. The Orchestrator issues ID tokens, access tokens, and refresh tokens to registered clients, acting as a standards-compliant authorization server.How It Works
The OIDC Provider authentication flow follows these steps:- Application redirects — A user accesses an application registered as an OIDC relying party. The application redirects the user to the Orchestrator’s authorization endpoint.
- Upstream authentication — The Orchestrator routes the user to the configured upstream identity provider (Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, etc.) for authentication. If multiple IdPs are configured, failover rules determine which to use.
- Attribute enrichment — After authentication, the Orchestrator loads additional attributes from configured attribute providers (directories, databases, APIs) and enriches the user’s profile.
- Token issuance — The Orchestrator generates OIDC tokens (ID token, access token, optional refresh token) with claims mapped from the authenticated identity and enriched attributes.
- Application receives tokens — The application receives the tokens at its redirect URI and uses them for session establishment and authorization decisions.
- Ongoing token operations — The Orchestrator serves the JWKS endpoint for token verification, handles token introspection and revocation, and manages token refresh flows.
Use Cases
- SSO consolidation — Unify multiple IdPs behind a single OIDC interface so applications authenticate against one provider.
- IdP migration with zero downtime — Move users between identity providers transparently while applications continue to use the same OIDC endpoints.
- Legacy app modernization — Add OIDC-based authentication to older applications without rewriting them.
- Claim enrichment from multiple sources — Combine attributes from multiple Identity Fabric connectors into a single set of OIDC claims.
Key Concepts
Claims Mapping
Claims mapping translates attributes from upstream identity providers into OIDC token claims. The formatconnector.attribute (e.g., upstream-idp.email) references a specific claim from a named connector. This enables enriching tokens with data from multiple identity sources.
IdP Failover
When multiple identity providers are listed underauthentication.idps, the Orchestrator tries them in order. If the primary IdP is unavailable, authentication falls back to the next provider seamlessly — no application changes required.
Token Types
The Orchestrator issues two token formats: JWT tokens (self-contained, verified via JWKS) and opaque tokens (reference tokens, verified via introspection). Choice depends on whether resource servers can validate locally or must call back.Service Extensions
Go-based extension hooks allow custom logic at key points in the flow — custom authentication checks, custom claim building, and custom attribute loading. These provide escape hatches when standard configuration is insufficient.Resources and Dependencies
An OIDC app declares the Identity Fabric components and service extensions it uses as its resources. Identity providers, attribute providers, and service extensions must be added to the app’s resources before they can be referenced anywhere else in its configuration — the authentication source, authorization rules, claim sources, and the Access Token and ID Token claim service extensions all select from the app’s declared resources. This guarantees every reference points at a component the app actually uses.Setup
- Console UI
- Configuration
In the Maverics Console you create an OIDC app from a few essentials, then refine the rest of its configuration from the application’s settings page.Once created, the settings page presents the configuration as a set of cards. Click Edit on a card to open its drawer.Client Configuration
Start a new OIDC application
Go to Applications in the sidebar, click Create, and select OIDC-based.
Enter the details
Provide:
- Name — the friendly name of your application.
- Client ID — the client ID OIDC clients use to authenticate. A unique value is suggested by default; keep it, or replace it with the existing
client_idwhen migrating an existing integration. - Public Client (optional) — enable for single-page or native apps that cannot securely store credentials. Public clients cannot use flows that require a client secret, such as
client_credentials. - Client authentication — a Client Secret or a JWT public key (RFC 7523).
- Grant Types — the flows this client supports. New apps default to Authorization Code and Refresh Token; the create form offers only modern and machine-to-machine flows (legacy flows can be enabled later).
- Redirect URLs — the allow-list of URLs your clients can be redirected to. Required when Authorization Code is used.
- Authentication Source — the identity service or authentication service extension that authenticates users. Required for interactive grants; not needed for non-interactive grants (Client Credentials, Token Exchange) since there is no end user to sign in.
- Client Credentials — the Client ID and the client authentication method: one or more Client Secret values, or JWT Client Authentication (RFC 7523) with a name, optional audience, and a public key from an uploaded file or a secret store reference.
- Redirect URLs & Endpoints — the Redirect URLs allow-list, an optional Default Redirect URL (Fallback) toggle, and Logout Redirect URLs.
- Application Security Settings — Public Client, Require DPoP, and CORS (Allowed Origins and Include Credentials).
- PKCE Configuration — Bypass Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE), for legacy apps only.
- Grant Types — choose from Recommended and Modern Flows (Authorization Code, Refresh Token), Machine to Machine and Agentic Flows (Client Credentials, Token Exchange), and Legacy or Deprecated Flows (ROPC, Implicit (ID Token), Implicit (Access Token)).
- Audience & Resource Configuration — the Allowed Audiences permitted in token requests.
- Access Token Settings — Type (JWT or Opaque), Lifetime Seconds, and Length (22—256 characters for opaque tokens).
- Refresh Token Settings — Allow Offline Access, Lifetime Seconds, and Length (22—256 characters).
- Authentication — select the authentication source (an identity provider, continuity strategy, or authentication service extension from the app’s resources) that establishes who the user is.
- Authorization — choose an Authorization method: Allow all access, Use rules to define access, Use service extension, or Use rules + service extension.
- Rules-Based Authorization — when using rules, define conditions with an Identity Source, Attribute, Condition (Equals, Contains, Does not equal, Does not contain), and Value. Combine conditions within a rule, and combine multiple rules, using AND/OR.
- Token Minting — optionally define Rego access-token minting policies (each with a Policy Name and Policy Code) that run across all grant types before a token is returned. At least one policy must accept the access token for the request to succeed.
- Attribute to Standard OIDC Claim Mapping — map each OIDC claim by name to a source (one of the app’s resources) and a value, so issued tokens carry consistent user information such as name, email, or roles.
- Custom Claim Service Extensions — optionally select a service extension to build non-standard claims for the Access Token and/or the ID Token.
- Custom OAuth Scopes — define additional scopes beyond the standard
openid,profile,email, andoffline_access.
DPoP (Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession)
DPoP (RFC 9449) creates sender-bound access tokens — the token is cryptographically tied to a specific client’s key pair, preventing token theft and replay attacks. When a client presents a DPoP-bound access token, it must also present a proof that it possesses the private key. If an attacker intercepts the access token, they cannot use it without the client’s private key. DPoP is configured per-app on OIDC Provider applications. When enabled, the Orchestrator validates DPoP proof headers on token requests and issues sender-bound access tokens.- Console UI
- Configuration
In the Console, DPoP is set on the application’s Client Configuration card under Application Security Settings. Enable Require DPoP to bind issued access tokens to the client’s key; DPoP proofs are rejected if they are older than five minutes or issued more than five minutes in the future.
| Key | Type | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
dpop.enabled | Boolean | false | Enable DPoP sender-bound access tokens per RFC 9449. When enabled, the Orchestrator validates DPoP proof headers and binds issued tokens to the client’s public key. |
dpop.nonce.disabled | Boolean | false | When false (the default), the Orchestrator requires a server-issued nonce in DPoP proofs. This prevents pre-generated proof replay. Set to true to disable the nonce requirement. |
DPoP provides defense against token exfiltration attacks. Even if an access token is stolen from a log, cache, or network trace, it cannot be used without the corresponding private key. For maximum security, combine DPoP with short token lifetimes and TLS for transport-level protection.
JWT and Opaque Token Options
TheaccessToken.type field controls whether the OIDC Provider issues JWT tokens or opaque (reference) tokens:
-
JWT tokens (
accessToken.type: jwt) — Self-contained tokens that include claims directly. Resource servers can validate them locally using the JWKS endpoint without calling back to the provider. This is the most common choice for APIs and modern applications. -
Opaque tokens (
accessToken.type: opaque) — Random string tokens that carry no claims. Resource servers must call the introspection endpoint to validate them. Use opaque tokens when you need to revoke tokens immediately or avoid exposing claims to intermediate services.
- Console UI
- Configuration
In the Console, the access token format is set on the application’s Grant Types & Tokens card under Access Token Settings. Choose the Type — JWT or Opaque — and optionally set Lifetime Seconds and, for opaque tokens, Length (22—256 characters).
Token Minting Policies
OIDC apps can attach OPA token minting policies that the Orchestrator evaluates on every token request before issuance. They add a governance layer on top of authentication and authorization — even after a user authenticates, a policy can deny or constrain the token based on client identity, grant type, requested scopes, or environmental conditions. In the Console, manage these on the application’s Access Control card under Token Minting (each policy has a Policy Name and Policy Code). In YAML, they are defined underauthorization.tokenMinting.accessToken.policies.
For the policy input document, the result output schema, and worked deny-by-default Rego examples, see OPA token minting policies in the Policies guide.
Troubleshooting
Token validation fails at the application
Token validation fails at the application
Symptoms: The application rejects tokens with “invalid signature”, “unable to verify token”, or similar errors.Causes:
- The JWKS endpoint is unreachable from the application’s network.
- A key mismatch occurred after key rotation — the application cached an old JWKS response.
- The
oidcProvider.discovery.issuerURL does not match theissclaim the application expects.
- Verify that
oidcProvider.discovery.issuermatches exactly what the application has configured as the issuer (including scheme, host, and path). - Confirm the JWKS endpoint is accessible from the application by requesting
<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configurationand following thejwks_uri. - If you recently rotated keys, ensure the active signing key is the first entry in the
jwksarray and that old keys are still present for verification of previously issued tokens.
Redirect URI mismatch
Redirect URI mismatch
Symptoms: Users see a “redirect_uri_mismatch” or “invalid redirect URI” error during the login flow.Causes:
- The redirect URL sent by the application is not listed in the app’s
redirectURLsarray. - A subtle mismatch in scheme (
httpvs.https), port, or trailing slash between the configured and requested redirect URI.
- Add the exact redirect URI (including scheme, host, port, and path) to
apps[].redirectURLsin the OIDC app configuration. - Compare the redirect URI in the browser’s address bar during the error with the configured values — they must match character-for-character.
Claims missing from tokens
Claims missing from tokens
Symptoms: The application receives a valid token but expected claims (e.g.,
email, groups) are empty or absent.Causes:- The
claimsMappingreferences a wrong connector name or attribute that does not exist on the upstream identity. - Attribute providers (
attrProviders) are not configured, so enrichment attributes are not loaded. - The upstream IdP does not return the expected attributes in its token or UserInfo response.
- Verify that connector names in
claimsMappingmatch theconnectors[].namevalues exactly. - If enrichment is needed, confirm
attrProvidersentries are configured with the correct connector names andusernameMapping. - Test the upstream IdP directly to confirm it returns the expected attributes.
IdP failover not working
IdP failover not working
Symptoms: Authentication fails when the primary IdP is down instead of falling back to a secondary IdP.Causes:
- Only one IdP is listed in
authentication.idps— there is no fallback configured. - The secondary IdP connector is misconfigured (wrong URL, expired credentials, network issue).
- Verify that multiple IdP connector names are listed in
authentication.idpsin the desired failover order. - Test each connector independently by temporarily making it the only entry to confirm it works on its own.
- Check Orchestrator logs for connector-specific error messages when failover is attempted.
Ephemeral key warning / tokens invalidated on restart
Ephemeral key warning / tokens invalidated on restart
Symptoms: All previously issued tokens become invalid after an Orchestrator restart. Logs may show a warning about ephemeral key generation.Causes:
- The
jwksarray is omitted fromoidcProvider, so the Orchestrator auto-generates an ephemeral RSA key pair on every startup. Each restart produces new keys, invalidating tokens signed with the previous keys.
- Provide explicit signing keys in the
oidcProvider.jwksarray using secret provider references (e.g.,<oidc.signingPublicKey>,<oidc.signingPrivateKey>). - Ensure both
publicKeyandprivateKeyare set for at least one entry in thejwksarray.
Related Pages
Applications
Overview of application types and routing configuration
OIDC Provider
Configure the Orchestrator as an OIDC authorization server
Identity Fabric
Connect identity sources for claim enrichment and IdP failover
Sessions
Session storage and lifecycle configuration